Kevin Patton

Academic Appointments

2016 - 2019, 2021                Adjunct Professor, University of Nebraska - Omaha

2020                                Instructor, Kansas State University

2019-2020, 2022 - Present        Visiting Professor, University of Nebraska - Omaha

Education

University of Nebraska-Lincoln

PhD, Philosophy, August 2024.

University of Nebraska-Lincoln

MA, Philosophy, May 2023.

University of Nebraska-Omaha

BA, Philosophy, May 2012.

AOS

Epistemology

AOC

Philosophy of Language, Value Theory, Metaethics, and Medical Ethics.

Conference Presentations

1. “Open Source Database Indexing as a Means of Assisting Non-Native English Speaking Students in Learning Philosophy.”

The 21st Biennial AAPT Conference on Teaching Philosophy, Saginaw, MI. July, 2016 

Research Grants and Awards

1. Created and taught the Philosophy 3070 course entitled Leadership Ethics in Practice for the University of Nebraska - Omaha.

2. Hinman Scholarship and Fellowship Award Philosophy Department, University of Nebraska - Lincoln, 2017

3. Outstanding Teaching Award

Teaching Recognition Award from Beta Theta Pi, 2012

Teaching Experience

University of Nebraska-Omaha, Instructor

Undergraduate Courses

1. Phil 3230: The Philosophy of Video Games (1x)
2. Phil 3070: Leadership Ethics in Practice (2x)
3. Phil 3060: Values and Virtues (1x)
4. Phil 3050: Ethical Theory (5x)
5. Phil 2300: Human Values in Medicine (2x)
6. Phil 2030: Introduction to Ethics (20x)
7. Phil 1210: Critical Reasoning / Introduction to Mathematical Logic (5x)
8. Phil 1010: Meaning of Life (6x)

Kansas State University, Instructor

1. Phil 365: Medical Ethics (2x)

University of Nebraska-Lincoln, Instructor

1. Phil 106: Introduction to Ethics (2x)
2. Phil 110: Introduction to Logic  (1x)

Service

1. Graduate Student Colloquium Organizer University of Nebraska-Lincoln, NE 2015-2016

Professional Membership

American Philosophical Association

American Association of Philosophy Teachers

Dissertation

Title:                The Value of Knowledge and its Problems

Committee:        David Henderson (committee chair)

                        William Melanson (reader)

                        Aaron Bronfman (reader)

                        Edward Becker (reader)

Abstract: This dissertation answers the three value problems in epistemology. These problems are that of 1) explaining the superior value of knowledge over mere true belief, 2) explaining the superior value of knowledge over all of the proper subsets of knowledge, and 3) explaining the superior kind of value that knowledge has in contrast to that which falls short. The methodology used to provide an answer to these problems relies on the arguments put forth in a rarely discussed paper from Ward Jones. In short, the Jonesian approach can be summed up as the view that epistemic axiology and analysis ought to be kept separate. The value of knowledge is not a matter of determining which of the various analyses of knowledge are correct. The Jonesian framework instead looks outside of the necessary and sufficient conditions of knowledge to find properties of knowledge which, though contingent, can explain the distinctive value of knowledge.  This framework, though remarkably robust, requires going against what I consider to be the orthodox approach to the problems. This orthodox approach relies on two axiological assumptions which, when subjected to criticism, lose any plausibility that they may have had. Once these assumptions are appropriately discarded, the Jonesian view has a straightforward answer to the first problem. Answering the second problem is almost as straightforward as the first once the disvalue of an unsatisfied Gettier condition is recognized. The third value problem, however, is a different kind of problem altogether. Answering it requires not only the Jonesian framework, but also a careful discussion of how we determine final value. Once this discussion is had, a Jonesian answer to the tertiary problem follows immediately. This dissertation closes by applying the Jonesian framework to a recent paper which argues that there can be no modal conditions on knowledge due to such conditions failing to help answer the value problems. This claim will be found wanting.